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Abstract
What value should we put on our chances of obtaining a good? This
paper argues that, contrary to the widely accepted theory of von Neumann
and Morgenstern, the value of a chance of some good G may be a non-
linear function of the value of G. In particular, chances may have dimin-
ishing marginal utility, a property that is termed chance uncertainty aver-
sion. The hypothesis that agents are averse to uncertainy about chances
explains a pattern of preferences often observed in the Ellsberg paradox.
While these preferences have typically been taken to refute Bayesian de-
cision theory, it is shown that chance risk aversion is perfectly compatible
with it.
Key Words: Chances, Ellsberg Paradox, Ambiguity, Ambiguity aver-
sion, Uncertainty
1 Introduction
Chances matter. My chances of getting cancer inuence my decisions about
what to eat, how much exercise to do and whether to smoke. The chances of
rainfall a¤ect where I choose to holiday. My chances of winning bigsway my
decision for or against entering the National Lottery. These chances matter to
me because the things that they are chances-of matter to me. I care about the
chances of cancer because I want to avoid cancer, about the chances of rainfall
because I prefer to walk in the sunshine, and so on.
How much do chances matter? Or to put the question slightly di¤erently,
how much value should we attach to having a chance of a certain magnitude of
obtaining some good? In particular, how does it depend on the value of what
it is a chance-of? There is a well-established answer to this question, in its
contemporary form deriving from the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern
on decision making under risk. What von Neumann and Morgensterns theory
(vN-M for short) tells us, in essence, is that the value of obtaining a chance of a
good is a positive linear function of the value of the good. Suppose, for instance,
that we are o¤ered the option of a chance x of some good G and that we value
1
G to degree g. Then the vN-M theory tells us to value this option to degree
x g, i.e. that the value of a chance x of G is the value of G discounted by x.
The discount reects the fact that the option does not deliver G with certainty;
its magnitude the degree to which the chance of G that it o¤ers falls short of
such certainty.
Von Neumann and Morgensterns theory is not, of course, restricted in its ap-
plication to options involving a single outcome. In general it says that the value
of an option inducing a probability distribution over a set of mutually exclusive
outcomes (a lottery) is an additive linear function of the probability-utility
products of each outcome. The additivity property is controversial however, so
I will stick to the simple cases where only one good is at stake. But even for
these simple cases, I will argue, the vN-M theory gets it wrong: The value of
a chance x of G can permissibly deviate from the x-discounted value of G. My
main focus will be on the hypothesis that it is frequently greater than this value,
but in principle it can deviate in both directions.
Consider a mountain climber whose enjoyment of climbing partially derives
from confronting risk.1 For her the activity is of little worth if there is no
associated chance of death or injury, even though it is to be avoided if the
chances of death or injury are too high. Indeed there is an optimal region of
risk, when the chances of death or injury are high enough to require courage of
the climber, but not so high as to make the activity foolish. I think that, even
if we dont share the climbers readiness to embrace risks of this kind, many of
us will recognise the contribution that risks of losses or failures makes to the
worth of activities we value.
Now the values that the mountain climber puts on the di¤erent chances of
death and injury are clearly incompatible with the vN-M theory. When the
values of the chances of an outcome are a positive linear function of the value of
the outcome two things must be the case. Firstly if the outcome has a positive
value (i.e. it is a good) then so too must a chance of this outcome and if it has
a negative value (its a bad) then so too must the chance. And secondly, the
marginal values of the chances must be constant; for instance, the di¤erence
in value between a quarter chance and a half chance must be the same as the
di¤erence between a half chance and a three-quarter chance. Neither holds in
our example. For the value the mountain climber puts on the chances of death
and injury (the bads) are not uniformly negative. And furthermore the marginal
values of the chances vary with their magnitude.
The mountain climber is a dramatic example of a commonplace phenom-
enon: that we value chances of goods non-linearly.2 In particular, we very often
(permissibly) attach greater value to increases in our chances of a good when
they are low than when they are high, a pattern of valuation that implies an
aversion to uncertainty about the chances of obtaining a desired good that is
analogous to risk aversion with respect to a good like money. The aim of this
paper is to show that such aversion to uncertainty about the chances explains a
pattern of preferences ambiguity aversion that is often observed in the Ells-
berg paradox and similar contexts. This pattern is typically taken either to
refute Savages version of Bayesian decision theory or to be irrational. I shall
1 I got this example from Peter Wakker, who attributed it to Edi Karni. Others claim to
have heard it elsewhere and it seems that it is part of decision-theory folklore.
2For further discussion of the relation between rational attitudes to chances and non-
linearity, see Stefansson and Bradley (forthcoming).
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argue to the contrary: Aversion to uncertainty about the chances of some out-
come is a perfectly rational attitude to exhibit and one that is not disallowed by
Bayesian decision theory.
This argument hinges on a distinction between the objective chances of some
outcome and our subjective beliefs about it and, correspondingly, between the
objective and subjective uncertainty we face in our decisions. What exactly
objective chances are is a matter of continuing debate in philosophy and not
one that I will engage with here. All that matters for the purposes of this
paper is that they are features of the world (perhaps frequencies, perhaps the
propensities that account for them) rather than properties of the agents state of
mind, so that it is intelligible that the agent can have beliefs about the chances
of events in the same way that she has beliefs about the events themselves. It is
true that many well-known Bayesians denied the existence of objective chances,
but such metaphysical views are not essential to Bayesian decision theory. In
any case what matters from a descriptive point of view is not whether there
really are mind-independent chances or not, but whether some agents believe
that there are. And of the latter, there is little doubt.
I shall proceed as follows. After presenting the Ellsberg paradox, I will
argue that its usual representation is awed and suggest an alternative. The
alternative representation will support the diagnosis that the preference patterns
often observed in this context can be attributed to an aversion on the part of
agents to uncertainty about the chances of gaining the monetary prizes at stake
in the decision problem. Uncertainty aversion, I will argue, is a property of
agentsutility functions for chances of goods that is compatible with Savages
theory, but only if the vN-M theory is false. In the last section I compare this
account of ambiguity aversion to several rival ones, focusing on the theory of
Klibano¤, Marinacci and MukerjI (2005).
2 Ellsbergs Paradox
In a justly famous paper on decision making under uncertainty, Ellsberg (1961)
presents two experiments that he claims reveal a aw in Savages decision theory.
Let us begin by recalling the second of these: the single-urn experiment that is
depicted in Table 1. In the set-up Ellsberg describes, an urn is said to contain
90 balls, 30 of which are red, and the remaining 60 are black or yellow in an
unknown proportion. Subjects are rst asked to choose between two bets. The
rst, B1, pays $100 if, in a random draw from the urn, a red ball is drawn.
The second, B2, pays $100 if a black ball is drawn. In a second choice problem,
subjects are asked to choose between B3 and B4, which respectively pay out
$100 in the event of either a red or yellow ball being drawn and in the event of
either a black or yellow ball being drawn.
Ellsberg conjectured that many people would express a preference for B1
over B2 and for B4 over B3. As can easily be veried however, the preferences
B1  B2 and B4  B3 are inconsistent with the Bayesian prescription to max-
imise subjective expected utility (throughout  and  respectively denote the
agents weak and strict preferences over options). For whatever probability is
assigned to the possible states of the world and whatever utility is assigned
to the monetary consequences, the expected utility of B1 can exceed that of
B2 only if the expected utility of B3 exceeds that of B4. Indeed this pattern
3
red black yellow
B1 $100 $0 $0
B2 $0 $100 $0
B3 $100 $0 $100
B4 $0 $100 $100
Table 1: The Ellsberg Paradox
of preferences hereafter the Ellsberg preferences threatens more than one
Bayesian principle of rationality. It is evident from the fact that the yellow
column displays the same consequences for the two pairs of acts, that the Ells-
berg preferences violate the Sure-thing principle (Savages P2), the requirement
that preferences be separable across states of the world. But they are also in-
consistent with the way in which subjective probabilities are elicited in Savages
framework. To see this, note that it follows from Savages denition of the qual-
itative probability relation that B1  B2 i¤ the event red is more probable
than the event blackand that B4  B3 i¤ the event black or yellowis more
probable than the event red or yellow. But the the laws of probability require
that redis more probable than blacki¤ for any event X disjoint with both,
red or X is more probable than black or X. Technically, Savages axiom of
comparative probability (postulate P4) is not violated by the Ellsberg prefer-
ences independently of his other postulates. But, as Machina and Schmeidler
(1992) point out, they are inconsistent with a strengthening of it (their strong
axiom of comparative probability) that is generally taken to be characteristic
of probabilistic sophistication, i.e. choice that is based on precise probabilis-
tic beliefs. So it would seem that a Bayesian agent could not display Ellsberg
preferences.
2.1 Re-framing Ellsbergs Problem
Since Ellsbergs paper there have been numerous experiments reporting patterns
of preference akin to those conjectured by Ellsberg, at least in set-ups similar
to his.3 Ellsbergs own explanation for these preferences was that agents are
averse to what he calls ambiguity, this being the lack of information as to the
precise probability distribution over the state space. In the rst choice situation
in which the subjects nd themselves they are given information which makes
it reasonable for them to put the probability of drawing a red ball at one-third,
but with regard to the probability of a black ball they know only that it is no
more than two-thirds. In view of this many people, Ellsberg conjectured, would
play it safeand opt for the lottery with a known probability of paying out over
the one in which there is a good deal of uncertainty about the probability of a
win. Similar reasoning would lead them, in the second choice problem, to pick
lottery B4 which has a knownprobability of two-thirds of paying out over B3
with its unknownprobability of a win.
Ellsbergs work has fostered the development of a large number of models of
decision making under conditions of ambiguity which relax either the Sure-thing
3See Wakker (2010) and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (forthcoming 2015) for a review of
the literature.
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RBB RBY RYY
red black red black yellow red yellow
B1 $100 $0 $100 $0 $0 $100 $0
B2 $0 $100 $0 $100 $0 $0 $0
B3 $100 $0 $100 $0 $100 $100 $100
B4 $0 $100 $0 $100 $100 $0 $100
Table 2: Rened State Space Representation
principle or the assumption that individuals are probabilistically sophisticated
(or both). But if Ellsbergs conjecture about how subjects perceive the deci-
sion problem they face is correct, then Table 1 does not provide the correct
representation of their decision problem. A properly specied decision problem,
from Savages point of view, is one in which the descriptions of states are max-
imally specic with regard to the presence or absence of all factors relevant to
the determination of consequences that are causally independent of the actions
available to the agent, and in which descriptions of consequences are maximally
specic with regard to features that matter to the agents evaluation of their
desirability. Now, on Ellsbergs analysis, agents have attitudes to the distribu-
tion of balls in the urn as well as to the monetary gains attendant on a draw
of a ball of a particular colour. This means that strictly speaking the states
of the world are not draws of a red, black or yellow ball but combinations of
distributions of balls in the urn plus the draw from it; such as The urn contains
30 red balls, 25 black balls and 35 yellow balls. A yellow ball is drawnand
The urn contains 30 red balls, 60 black balls and no yellow balls. A red ball is
drawn. Together with the chosen act, these two features of the states determine
two di¤erent features of the consequences; respectively the chances of obtaining
the prize and its monetary value.
To determine whether taking into account the distribution from which a ball
is drawn makes any di¤erence, we need to draw up the fully rened decision
problem. Writing out all the states would be rather tedious however, so I will
consider a simple variant of Ellsbergs set-up in which the urn contains only
three balls: One red ball and either two black or two yellow or one of each. This
set-up has the same coarse grained representation as Ellsbergs (i.e. that given
by Table 1) but a much simpler rened one, while sharing what seem to be
the crucial structural features. So it seems reasonable to presume that agents
preferences will be the same in the simplied set-up as in the original one (and
every model of ambiguity aversion that I know of predicts that they will be).
The rened state space in the simplied Ellsberg set-up consists of seven
possible states: The possible combinations of distributions of balls and draws
of a ball of a particular colour. This suggests a representation as in Table 2,
where RBB, RBY and RYY denote the three possible distributions (with, for
instance, RBB being the distribution consisting of one red ball and two black
balls) and red, blackand yellowthe colour of ball drawn from it.
Table 2, unlike Table 1, allows for transparent separation of the agents
subjective uncertainty regarding the distribution of balls from the objective un-
certainty she faces concerning the colour of the ball that will be drawn, given
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RBB RBY RYY
B1
1
3
1
3
1
3
B2
2
3
1
3 0
   
B3
1
3
2
3 1
B4
2
3
2
3
2
3
Table 3: The Coarser Ellsberg Paradox
a particular distribution. A number of authors, including Machina (2011), Er-
gun and Gul (2009) and Klibano¤ et al (2005), have exploited this separation
to show that there is no incompatibility between the Ellsberg preferences and
application of Savages axioms to the coarse partition of events {RBB, RBY,
RYY}, the domain of her subjective uncertainty.4 (This is perhaps evident from
the fact that the two pairs of acts, B1 and B2, and B3 and B4, have di¤erent
consequences in each coarse state, so that the Sure-thing principle is vacuously
satised). And this suggests, as Segal (1990) and others have argued, that
ambiguity aversion derives from a failure on the part of the agent to correctly
combine subjective and objective uncertainty by reducing the two-tiered state
space to a single-tiered one consisting of the seven states (RBB, red), (RBB,
black), etc.,.
As we shall see, this reasoning takes us some, but not all, of the way to the
truth. To unpack it further, let us look at a di¤erent coarse-grained represen-
tation of the simplied Ellsberg set-up, one in which states are individuated by
distributions of balls in the urn and consequences are chances of monetary gains.
This is illustrated in Table 3 in whose cell entries are the chances of winning
$100. Thus an entry of x indicates that making that choice when the world is
in that state gives the agent a chance of x of winning $100 and a chance of 1 x
of winning nothing.
Table 3 represents the betting acts B1 to B4 as functions from possible ball
distributions to chances. Now let us suppose that our agent is a subjective
expected utility maximiser à la Savage and moreover that she regards the three
possible states of the world as equally likely (perhaps in virtue of symmetry
considerations). In this case, a preference for B1 over B2 reveals that for the
agent, with utility U on the chances of winning $100, it must be the case that
U( 13 ) >
1
3U(
2
3 )+
1
3U(
1
3 )+
1
3U(0), while a preference for B4 over B3 reveals that
for the agent U( 23 ) >
1
3U(
1
3 ) +
1
3U(
2
3 ) +
1
3U(1). Together these imply that:
U(
1
3
)  U(0) > U(2
3
)  U(1
3
) > U(1)  U(2
3
) (1)
So we can conclude that an agent who assigns equal probability to the distrib-
utions and maximises subjective expected utility can have Ellsberg preferences
4Machina (2011) points out that this is also true of the application of the vN-M axioms to
the domain of objective uncertainty.
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over betting acts, provided she values gains in chances of monetary payo¤s less
as the minimum/maximum chance rises, i.e. if the chances of money have di-
minishing marginal utility for her. That is to say, contrary to the received view,
the Ellsberg preferences are not, on the face of it, ruled out by Bayesian decision
theory.
2.2 Ambiguity Aversion
An agent with diminishing marginal utilities for the chances of some good (i.e.
with a concave utility function on the chances) will be averse to uncertainty
regarding what those chances are. Uncertainty aversion, in the way that I will
use the term, is the analogue in contexts where the probabilities of states are
not known to the more familiar phenomenon of risk aversion. An agent is
canonically said to be risk neutral with respect to some divisible good if she is
indi¤erent between a xed amount of the good and a lottery which yields the
same expected amount of it, but risk averse (loving) if she prefers the former
(latter). For instance an agent who is risk averse with regard to money will prefer
an act which always pays $50 over one with a 50:50 chance of paying either $100
or nothing. Similarly, someone who is uncertainty averse with respect to some
good will prefer acts which yield a constant quantity of the good to those that
yield the same expected quantity of it (relative to her subjective probabilities),
but have a greater spread.
The same applies to someone who is uncertainty averse with respect to the
chances of receiving some good (divisible or otherwise). They will prefer acts
which yield constant chances of getting the good over acts with the same ex-
pected chances when the chances vary by state of the world.5 Consider Table 4,
for instance, which adds two acts (B0 and B5) to the simplied Ellsberg set-up.
Someone who regards the distributions RBB and RYY as equiprobable will be
indi¤erent between B2 and B0 and between B3 and B5. If, furthermore, they
are neutral with regard to the chances of monetary gain that are the outcomes
of these acts they will regard B1 as equally good as both B2 and B0 and B4 as
equally good as both B3 and B5. But if they are uncertainty averse with re-
spect to these chances they will prefer B1 over the other two because the utility
di¤erence between a chance of one-third of the $100 and no chance of it exceeds
that between a chance of two-thirds and a chance of one-third. Similarly they
will prefer B4 to both B3 and B5.
Uncertainty attitudes to goods and uncertainty attitudes to the chances
of these goods are logically independent. One could be uncertainty neutral
with regard to money, but uncertainty averse with respect to the chances of
obtaining it. Or just the other way around. But in one crucial respect they
are similar: there is nothing particularly rational or irrational about having one
uncertainty attitude rather than another.6 We certainly do, as a matter of fact,
care about the chances of outcomes as well as the outcomes themselves. There
is a di¤erence, we tend to think, between having no lottery ticket at all and
5What I am calling uncertainty aversion with respect to chances, Ergin and Gul (2009)
call second order risk aversion. The term is misleading, I feel, because it suggests that the
second-order probabilities are of the same kind as the rst order and that what is involved
is the sort of failure to reduce the second-order probabilities to rst-order ones examined by
Segal (1990) (which is straightforwardly irrational).
6 In this respect, uncertainty attitudes di¤er from risk attitudes. Someone who was risk
averse to chances would be making a mistake.
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RBB RBY RYY
B0
2
3
1
3 0
B1
1
3
1
3
1
3
B2 0
1
3
2
3
   
B3
1
3
2
3 1
B4
2
3
2
3
2
3
B5 1
2
3
1
3
Table 4: Hedging Acts
having a lottery ticket which is not, in fact, a winner. And between succeeding
at a task when the chance of doing so was low and succeeding at it when the
chance of doing so was very high.
Now agents who are uncertainty averse with respect to the chances of obtain-
ing a good will tend to hedge their chances in the sense of preferring mixtures
of equally preferred acts to either of these acts, a pattern of choice that decision
theorists, following Schmeidler (1989), regard as the characteristic behavioural
property of ambiguity aversion. More formally, let f and g be any two acts
whose outcomes are chances of some good. For any  2 [0; 1], let the -mixture
of f and g, denoted f + (1   )g, be an act whose consequence in each state
of the world, s, is dened by:
(f + (1  )g)(s) = f(s) + (1  )g(s)
Then ambiguity aversion is behaviourally characterised by a preference for an
-mixture of f and g over both f and g, for any acts f and g between which
the agent is indi¤erent.
In Table 4, for instance, B1 can be regarded as an equal weighted mixture
of B2 and B0, and B4 as an equal weighted mixture of B3 and B5, with mixing
producing more constancy in the consequences. And an agent who regards the
states RBB, RBY and RYY as equiprobable will be indi¤erent between B2 and
B0 and between B3 and B5. So ambiguity aversion is revealed by a preference
for B1 over both B2 and B0 (and for B4 over both B3 and B5) just the pref-
erence patterns of a chance uncertainty averse expected utility maximiser. The
hypothesis of diminishing marginal utility of chances thus a¤ords a Bayesian
rationalisation of behavioural ambiguity aversion.
2.3 Resolving the Paradox
The fact that ambiguity aversion is derivable from Savages theory together
with the hypothesis of chance uncertainty aversion replaces one paradoxwith
another. Did we not show in an earlier section that the ambiguity averse pref-
erences of Ellsbergs subjects were inconsistent with Savages postulates? So
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is the demonstrated compatibility not just an artice of the re-framing of the
decision problem, which succeeds in hiding the violation of the Sure-Thing
principle evidentin the framing given by Table 1? To address this challenge,
an explanation as to why the two framings of Ellsbergs set-up lead to di¤erent
conclusions must be provided.
First, let me concede that for equation (1) not to imply a violation of subjec-
tive expected utility theory, it cannot be that, for any chance x of obtaining the
$100, U(x) = xU($100). For were this the case it would follow, in contradiction
to equation (1), that:
U(
1
3
)  U(0) = 1
3
U($100) = U($100)  2
3
U($100) = U(1)  U(2
3
) (2)
But this is precisely what is required by Savages theory when the decision
problem is as represented in either Table 1 or Table 2, i.e. when the consequences
are taken to be the monetary prizes. So either these framings are at fault or,
contrary to my earlier claim, preferences that are uncertainty averse with respect
to chances are not consistent with subjective expected utility theory.
Most decision theorists have taken Table 2, or something much like it, to be
the correct fully-rened representation of the simplied Ellsberg problem and
so have concluded the latter. But the former answer is the correct one. The
problem with the framing of the decision problem given in both Table 1 and
Table 2 is that the winning of the $100, or otherwise, is not all that matters if
agents care about the chances of outcomes as well as the outcomes themselves.
Winning nothing when you pick B1 and a black ball is drawn may not be as
bad as winning nothing when you pick B2 and a yellow ball is drawn. For in the
latter case, but not the former, you not only win nothing, but you also had no
chance of winning anything. So the signicance of winning is di¤erent in the two
cases. It follows that in the representation given by Table 2, consequences have
utilities that are state-dependent. But, as observed earlier, to apply Savages
theory you must start with descriptions of the states and consequences which
are adequate in the sense that they are maximally specic with regard to all that
is relevant in determining the outcomes of actions and with regard to all that
matters to the agent. So, in particular, consequences in the simplied Ellsberg
set-up should be objects of the form Win $100 when the chance of winning is
xand not simply Win $100.7
The upshot is that a fully rened representation of the decision problem
should take the form given by Table 5, not Table 2. In this representation
the consequences are given by pairs of the form (x; $y) where x is the chance of
obtaining the $100 and y the amount of money actually won. Once consequences
are properly described, the apparent inconsistency between subjective expected
utility theory and the Ellsberg preferences found in Table 2 disappears. In
particular, it is evident that there is no violation of the Sure-thing principle as
the (RYY, yellow) column displays di¤erent chance-consequences for each act.
7This is not an endorsement of state-independence as a condition on preferences, just a
point about the conditions under which Savages theory applies.
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RBB RBY RYY
red black red black yellow red yellow
B1 (
1
3 ; 100) (
1
3 ; 0) (
1
3 ; 100) (
1
3 ; 0) (
1
3 ; 0) (
1
3 ; 100) (
1
3 ; 0)
B2 (
2
3 ; 0) (
2
3 ; 100) (
1
3 ; 0) (
1
3 ; 100) (
1
3 ; 0) (0; 0) (0; 0)
       
B3 (
1
3 ; 100) (
1
3 ; 0) (
2
3 ; 100) (
2
3 ; 0) (
2
3 ; 100) (1; 100) (1; 100)
B4 (
2
3 ; 0) (
2
3 ; 100) (
2
3 ; 0) (
2
3 ; 100) (
2
3 ; 100) (
2
3 ; 0) (
2
3 ; 100)
Table 5: Fully Rened Ellsberg Problem
3 A Trilemma for Decision Theory
Ellsbergs experiments, and others like it, provide strong evidence that at least
some people are ambiguity averse in some contexts. This fact creates an ex-
planatory trilemma for normative decision theory. As we have just seen, am-
biguity aversion can be explained by aversion to uncertainty about chances, a
rationally permissible property of the agents utility function that is perfectly
consistent with Savages theory. However, since chance uncertainty aversion is
not compatible with the vN-M theory (because, as we saw earlier, if the value
of a chance of good is a linear function of the chance, then the chances must
have constant marginal utility), the price of saving Savages theory in this way,
is that the vN-M theory must be rejected. Alternatively ambiguity aversion can
be explained in a manner consistent with the vN-M theory, but at the price of
rejecting Savages theory as the correct normative account of decision making
under subjective uncertainty. Finally, one can retain the theories of both Sav-
age and vN-M, but at the price of accepting that the Ellsberg preferences are
irrational. Most decision theorists graspeither the second or third horn of this
trilemma. Here I have argued for accepting the rst.
An important, if somewhat technical, qualication: Rejection of the vN-M
theory does not entail rejection of the vN-M axioms of preference over lotteries.
These axioms imply the existence of an expected utility representation of prefer-
ence, unique up to a¢ ne transformation, but unique as a type of representation
only up to positive monotone transformation. In the simple case to which we
restricted ourselves where there is only one good G, lotteries are just chances
of G, and the vN-M theory says that rational preference for these lotteries is
represented by a function EU on chances of G such that EU(x) = x, for any
chance x of G. But then any positive monotone transformation of EU also
ordinally represents these preferences. In particular, let (EU) be a concave
transformation of EU . It too represents the preferences of an agent who satis-
es the vN-M axioms, but does so in a way which encodes chance uncertainty
aversion. So these axioms do not settle the question of whether EU or (EU)
is the correct measure of the agents degrees of preference and hence whether
chance uncertainty neutrality is a requirement of rationality. When only pref-
erences amongst risky options are at stake there is perhaps no meaningful way
of settling the issue (or, for that matter, any point in doing so), but when we
widen consideration to uncertain options the situation changes. Whereas the
hypotheses that, respectively, EU or (EU) is the correct measure of the agents
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degrees of preference, are observationally equivalent with respect to her choices
amongst lotteries, these hypotheses conjoined with Bayesian decision theory are
not observationally equivalent with respect to her choices amongst acts with
consequences that are objective chances of goods.
To explore the trilemma more formally, let us state things within a framework
akin to the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) one in which much of the economics
literature on ambiguity attitudes is couched. Let Pr be a measure of the agents
degrees of belief on a set of states S = fsig and let acts be functions from
states of the world to consequences, which in this context are just the chances
of gaining some good G. Recall that the vN-M theory says that the value of
these chances is measured by a function EU , such that EU(x) = x:U(G), for
any chance x of G. Then on the theory I am advocating the function V on acts
such that, for any act f ,
V (f) =
X
i
(f(si))  Pr(si) (3)
is a subjective expected utility representation of the preferences of a rational
agent, with  a transformation of the chances (thus of EU , the vN-M utility
on chances) that represents her uncertainty attitudes to them. In particular 
is linear for chance uncertainty neutral agents, but concave for those that are
uncertainty averse.
The function V is an expectation based on (subjective) probabilities for
(objective) probabilities the chances of the good with the notable feature
that the two tiers of probability are not reducible to a single expectation for the
good. As mentioned before, this is a feature of a number of models of ambiguity
aversion to be found in the literature, including those of Segal (1990), Klibano¤
et al (2005), Seo (2009) and Ergin and Gul (2009). In particular, formally
speaking (and setting aside small di¤erences in vocabulary) our theory is just
the special case of the smooth ambiguity model of Klibano¤, Marinacci and
Mukerji (KMM for short) that is obtained when it is restricted to single-good
lotteries. (In their more general model,  is a transformation, not of the utility
of chances, but of an expected utility representation of the agents preferences
over lotteries; a natural generalisation of equation (3), at least when only a
single type of good is at stake.)
Where we di¤er is on the interpretation of the model. KMM seem to view the
function EU (more generally, vN-M expected utility) as an appropriate measure
of the desirability of chances (more generally, of lotteries) and  as a transfor-
mation induced by the kind of epistemic attitude that Ellsberg postulated: A
dislike of lack of information that distorts the subjective probabilistic weighting
of outcomes. I view (EU) itself as the correct measure of the desirability of
the lotteries, with  a pragmatic attitude to uncertainty about chances that is
encoded in the concavity of the utility function for chances. Finally Seo o¤ers a
formulation in which  encodes a failure to reduce two-stage lotteries. So adop-
tion of a model based on equation (3) returns us to the explanatory trilemma,
now focused on the interpretation of the function , with the alternatives of
rejecting Savage, vN-M, or the rationality of the Ellsberg preferences.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider in full the pros and cons of
each interpretation. But I will nish by looking at two issues that shed light on
the relative merits of the KMM interpretation and the one defended here.
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red black yellow
B1 -$100 $0 $0
B2 $0 -$100 $0
B3 -$100 $0 -$100
B4 $0 -$100 -$100
Table 6: The Negative Ellsberg Problem
3.1 Chances of Losses
Lets begin with the explanatory adequacy of the two accounts of behavioural
ambiguity aversion. Ellsbergs explanation of it in terms of a dislike of lack
of information has, for the most part, been accepted in the literature, but the
evidence considered so far is not in fact su¢ cient to distinguish this explanation
from one in terms of chance uncertainty aversion. The two hypotheses will have
di¤erent implications for predictions of behaviour in other domains however. If
it is the dislike of lack of information that motivates agents, then we should
expect to see ambiguity aversion to much the same extent in choices between
acts yielding other outcomes than the monetary gains considered so far, so long
as the same lack of information is involved. On the other hand, if it is the value
that agents place on the chances of obtaining goods that motivates them, then
the type of good involved will quite plausibly make a di¤erence. Agents may
well, for instance, value chances of goods like health and education di¤erently
from money in much the same way as they value the goods themselves di¤erently.
To take a particular example, lets consider a choice between acts that involve
chances of losses rather than gains. Such a decision problem, the negative image
of the Ellsberg paradox, is displayed in Table 6. In this set-up agents must
choose between lotteries that yield losses of $100 or $0, contingent on the colour
of a ball drawn from the same urn as in the standard Ellsberg set-up, i.e. one
containing one-third red balls and the rest black or yellow.
If individuals are ambiguity averse due to a preference for lotteries in which
the chances of the outcomes are known over those in which they are not, then
they will exhibit the same pattern of preferences in the Negative Ellsberg prob-
lem as they do in the standard Ellsberg set-up, namely B1  B2 and B4  B3.
The empirical data on this question is fairly sparse, but on the whole does not
support this prediction. Sujoy and Roy (2009), Abdellaoui et al (2005) and
Trautmann et al (2011), for instance, all report ambiguity aversion in choice ex-
periments involving monetary gains, but ambiguity seeking behaviour in those
involving monetary losses.8
Such a reversal of the Ellsberg preferences is hard to explain in terms of
aversion to lack of information. But they are hardly surprising if it is correct
that the chances themselves matter. For why should we not value gains and
losses in chances di¤erently depending on what our reference point for these
changes are (our initial chance endowment), just as we value gains and losses of
money and other goods di¤erently depending on our initial endowment? Indeed
if our uncertainty attitudes to the chances of outcomes match our uncertainty
attitudes to the outcomes themselves, then the fact that agents are often mildly
8See Wakker (2010) and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (forthcoming 2015) for a full review
of results.
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RBY RBB RYY
A1 $100 $0 $0
A2 $0 $100 $0
A3 $100 $0 $100
A4 $0 $100 $100
Table 7: The Epstein Paradox
uncertainty loving with regard to monetary losses would suggest similar uncer-
tainty loving attitudes towards chances of monetary losses. So the hypothesis
that agents have pragmatic attitudes to uncertainty about chances furnishes the
possibility of explaining the reversal of the typical Ellsberg preferences in the
domain of monetary losses.
3.2 Epsteins Paradox
In this nal subsection I want to consider the implications of an objection to
Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerjis (2005) smooth ambiguity model raised by
Larry Epstein (2010). KMM assume that rational agents are vN-M expected
utility maximiser over lotteries (and hence in particular on the chances of some
good) and Savage subjective expected utility maximisers over the space of acts
with non-risky consequences what they call second-orderacts. (Second-order
acts are important to their account because they allow for the identication of
the agents beliefs about the objective chances.)
Consider Table 7 which represents a decision problem involving the second-
order acts associated with the simplied Ellsberg paradox, with the states of
the world corresponding to the distributions of balls and monetary consequences
representing the prizes for correctly identifying which distribution is the true
one. Thus act A1 pays out when there is one ball of each colour, A2 when there
are two black balls in addition to the red, and so on.
Suppose that the distribution of balls is generated in the following way. An
urn (the second-orderurn) is lled with three balls, one of which is red and
the other two are either black or yellow, and a ball is drawn at random. If
the red ball is drawn then the Ellsberg rst-orderurn is made up as RBY, if
black is drawn then its made up as RBB and if yellow is drawn then its RYY.
In the light of this the decision problem represented by Table 7 is structurally
identical to the Ellsberg problem in that the consequence matrix is the same
and we hold the same information about the states, namely that RBY has an
objective probability of one-third, while both RBB and RYY have probabilities
between zero and two-thirds. Hence, Epstein argues, rational agents should
exhibit exactly the same pattern of preferences, namely A1  A2 and A4  A3.
But this is contrary to the assumption of KMM that preferences over second-
order acts should respect the Savage axioms.
Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji (2012) respond to Epstein by arguing that
his representation of his problem is inadequate and that once consideration
is given to all probability distributions over the contents of both urns, then
the smooth ambiguity model predicts the same preference pattern in Epsteins
set-up as in Ellsbergs. But this reply strikes me as unconvincing. Firstly,
it somewhat misses the essential point of Epsteins paradox, namely that the
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smooth ambiguity model does not allow for ambiguity aversion when the agent
is simply betting on what the chances are (i.e. when she is choosing amongst
second-order acts). His introduction of a second-order urn was presumably
motivated simply by the desire to make concrete the truth-conditions for these
chances.
Secondly, it seems to me that the prediction that Epstein attributes to the
KMM theory in his problem is in fact the correct prediction to make. For
Table 7 is not structurally identical to the Ellsberg problem when the latter is
properly represented as in Table 5. In the Ellsberg problem, chances are relevant
not just as determinants of the monetary payo¤s, but also as consequences. In
Epsteins problem, on the other hand, the chances are not at stake for the agent,
for they are not determined by their choice of action. Or to put it slightly
di¤erently, whereas in Epsteins problem there is ambiguity, in the sense of
lack of information about the chances, but no grounds for chance uncertainty
aversion, in Ellsbergs problem both are present. So we should expect ambiguity
aversion only in the latter case.
Epsteins example poses a di¢ cult challenge for the KMM theory. On the one
hand, their theory (and equation (3) in particular) prescribes di¤erent choices
in the Epstein and Ellsberg paradoxes; on the other hand, if ambiguity aversion
is an attitude to absence of information one would expect the same choices in
both. But if ambiguity aversion is viewed as a pragmatic attitude to chances,
the challenge is easily met. So chance uncertainty aversion provides a better
interpretation of their theory than the one that KMM adopts; an interpretation
that resolves both the Ellsberg and Epstein paradoxes.
4 Conclusion
I have argued that, contrary to the vN-M theory, we value the chances of goods
non-linearly and in particular that increases in our chances of a good are more
valuable when they are low than when they are high. This uncertainty aversion
with respect to chances provides an explanation of the patterns of behaviour
typically observed in the Ellsberg paradox. Moreover it is an explanation that
is consistent with the theory of subjective expected utility maximisation due to
Savage. This should not be taken to be blanket endorsement of Savages theory.
There are many situations in which we are unable to assign probabilities to all
relevant contingencies and in which Savages theory will not apply. But the
Ellsberg set-up is not one of them. Its lesson is not that rationality does not
require probabilistic sophistication, but rather that rationality does not require
uncertainty neutrality with respect to chances.
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